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Taxpayers sometimes engage in complex transactions with uncertain tax treatment, such as 
mergers, acquisitions, demergers and spin-offs. With the rise of global value chains and 
proliferation of multinational corporations, these transactions increasingly involve 
transnational financial arrangements and cross-border dealings, making tax treatment even 
more uncertain. If improperly structured, such transactions could have costly tax 
consequences. One approach to dealing with this uncertainty is to create a private rulings 
regime, whereby a taxpayer applies for a private ruling by submitting a statement detailing 
the transaction (proposed or completed) to the tax authority. The tax authority interprets and 
applies the tax laws to the requesting taxpayer’s specific set of facts in a written private 
ruling. The private ruling offers taxpayers certainty as to how the tax authority views the 
transaction, and the tax treatment the taxpayer can expect based on the specific facts 
presented. Private rulings are a common feature of many tax systems around the world, and 
their main goal is to promote tax certainty and increase investor confidence in the tax 
system. This is especially important in a developing country like Uganda, whose tax laws are 
often amended and may not anticipate emerging transnational tax issues. 
 
Private rulings in Uganda may be applied for in writing prior to or after engaging in the 
transaction. The Tax Procedures Code Act (TPCA), which provides for private rulings, 
requires applicants to make a full and true disclosure of the transaction before a private 
ruling may be issued. This paper evaluates the Ugandan private rulings regime, offering a 
comparative perspective by highlighting similarities and contrasts between the Ugandan 
regime and that of other jurisdictions, including the United States, Australia, South Africa and 
Kenya.  
 
The Ugandan private rulings regime has a number of strengths. It is not just an 
administrative measure as in some jurisdictions, but is based on statute. Rulings are issued 
from a central office – instead of different district offices, which may result in conflicting 
rulings. Rather than an elaborate appeals process, the private ruling is only binding on the 
URA and not on the taxpayer, so a dissatisfied taxpayer can simply ignore the ruling. The 
URA team that handles private rulings has diverse professional backgrounds, which allows 
for a better understanding of applications.  
 
There are, however, a number of limitations of the Ugandan private rulings system. The 
procedure of revocation of a private ruling is uncertain. Private rulings are not published, 
which makes them a form of ‘secret law’. There is no fee for private rulings, which contributes 
to a delay in the process of issuing one. There is understaffing in the unit that handles private 
rulings. Finally, there remains a very high risk of bias against the taxpayer because the unit is 
answerable to a Commissioner whose chief mandate is collection of revenue.  
 
A reform of the private rulings regime is therefore necessary, and this would include clarifying 
the circumstances under which revocation may occur, introducing an application fee, 




who does not have a collection mandate. While the private rulings regime in Uganda has 
shortcomings, it remains an essential tool in supporting investor confidence in the tax regime. 
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Taxpayers sometimes engage in complex transactions, such as mergers, acquisitions, 
demergers and spin-offs, whose tax treatment is uncertain. With the rise of global value 
chains and the proliferation of multinational corporations, such transactions increasingly 
involve transnational financial arrangements and cross-border dealings, making the tax 
treatment even more uncertain. If improperly structured, such transactions could have costly 
tax consequences. One approach to dealing with this uncertainty is the creation of a private 
rulings regime as part of a country’s tax system. A taxpayer applies for a private ruling by 
submitting a statement detailing the transaction (proposed or completed) to the tax authority. 
The tax authority interprets and applies the tax laws to the requesting taxpayer’s specific set 
of facts in a private ruling. A private ruling is therefore advice given by a tax authority upon 
request from a taxpayer in relation to the application of the tax law to a particular transaction 
(Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). Private rulings are a common feature of many tax systems 
around the world. A 2012 study of 61 tax jurisdictions by the global network of law firms, Lex 
Mundi, found that only four jurisdictions lacked anything akin to a private rulings system (Lex 
Mundi 2012).1 A 2015 study of 34 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries found that 33 allow taxpayers to request a private ruling (OECD 2015). A 
2015 study of tax rulings in European Union (EU) countries found that all 28 countries had 
some form of private rulings regime in place (Van de Velde 2015). African countries such as 
South Africa,2 Kenya,3 Tanzania,4 Malawi,5 and Zimbabwe6 all have a private rulings regime. 
Private rulings may be known as advance tax rulings or binding rulings in other jurisdictions 
(Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). 
 
Depending on the jurisdiction, private rulings may be binding or non-binding, written or oral, 
pre- or post- transaction, statutory or administrative. However, in the Ugandan context and 
for the purposes of this paper, private rulings are defined as a statutory mechanism through 
which the taxpayer may seek written advice from the tax authority before or after entering 
into a transaction regarding the tax treatment of that transaction. The advice given is binding 
on the tax authority, but not on the taxpayer.7 The benefit accruing from relying on a private 
ruling is personal to the taxpayer to whom that ruling is issued, such that the tax authority is 
not bound by its position in regards to other taxpayers in the same or similar circumstances. 
Uganda uses a self-assessment regime, where taxpayers are expected to file their returns 
and account for tax due from their transactions (URA 2020). However, there may be 
instances in which the law is ambiguous, or its application to a particular taxpayer’s 
transaction is otherwise uncertain. It is in these instances that a taxpayer may apply to the 
URA for a private ruling. 
 
Globally, private rulings regimes have proliferated in the last three decades. This is a result 
of a shift in approach within tax authorities, which now aspire for a higher degree of tax 
compliance and economic investment, and taxpayers who pursue greater legal certainty 
 
1  These jurisdictions were Serbia, Isle of Man, Cayman Islands and China (with the exception of Hong Kong). 
2  ‘Binding Private Rulings’ SARS 30 April 2020, www.sars.gov.za/Legal/Interpretation-Rulings/Published-Binding-
Rulings/Binding-Private-Rulings/Pages/default.aspx. 
3  Section 65 of the Kenya Tax Procedures Act No. 29 of 2015 available at 
https://kra.go.ke/images/publications/TaxProceduresAct29of2015.pdf. 
4  Section 11 of the Tanzania Tax Administration Act 2015 available at 
www.tra.go.tz/tax%20laws/Tax%20Administration%20Act%202015%20English%20Version.pdf. 
5  Malawi Revenue Authority, Taxpayer Charter: Your Rights and Obligations (October, 2017) available at 
www.mra.mw/assets/upload/downloads/Taxpayer_Charter.pdf. 
6  Section 34D of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority Act Chapter 23:11 available at https://zimlii.org/zw/legislation/num-
act/1999/17/revenue%20authority%20act%202311updated.pdf. 




(Van de Velde 2015). Private rulings have received considerable attention from tax scholars 
and practitioners in Europe, America, Australia and Asia in recent years (Givati 2009). 
However, there is very little literature on the subject in Africa. This paper seeks to remedy 
this, by comprehensively documenting and evaluating the administration of the private rulings 
regime in Uganda. The purpose of this paper is: 
 
1. To describe the current law and practice relating to private rulings in Uganda. 
2. To highlight the shortcomings of the current private rulings regime in Uganda. 
3. To develop possible means of improving the current private rulings regime in Uganda. 
 
This paper is a descriptive study employing various qualitative methods, including textual 
analysis, interviews and auto-ethnography. The textual analysis covered both primary and 
secondary literature, including academic articles, parliament Hansards, domestic tax 
statutes, foreign tax statutes, and case law from Uganda and other jurisdictions. Statutes and 
case law from other jurisdictions including the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Kenya 
and South Africa were used for comparative purposes. The authors conducted 20 interviews 
within and outside the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), the country’s tax authority. In the 
URA, we interviewed 12 people – two Assistant Commissioners, two managers, four 
supervisors and four officers. Outside the URA we interviewed four people from audit firms, 
and four from tax advisory law firms. Finally, the first two authors drew from their personal 
experience in administering the private rulings regime in Uganda. The first author worked 
with the URA for 25 years, 10 of which were spent as a supervisor in the Rulings and 
Interpretations unit of the Business Policy Division (BPD) in the Domestic Taxes Department 
(DTD) of the URA, during which time he participated in the drafting and issuing of over 200 
private rulings. The second author has worked as an officer in the Rulings and Interpretations 
unit of the BPD in the DTD of the URA for 2 years, during which time he participated in the 
drafting and issuing of 20 private rulings. 
 
The paper proceeds in four parts. Part 1 examines the rationale for a private rulings regime, 
particularly highlighting justifications given by commentators in academic literature and 
judges in case law. Part 2 analyses the current private rulings regime in Uganda, describing 
the relevant law, practice and procedures involved, and the three potential outcomes of 
rejection of the application, a favourable ruling and an unfavourable ruling. Part 2 also 
examines the law relating to the revocation of a private ruling in light of the fact that the 
central rationale of this mechanism is to create certainty in tax law. Part 3 provides an 
evaluation of the private rulings regime, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses, and 
recommending possible ways of improving it. Finally, Part 4 provides the conclusion of the 




1  Rationale for the private rulings regime 
 
1.1 Promote certainty in tax law 
 
Private rulings are intended to provide taxpayers with certainty regarding the Commissioner 
General’s (CG’s) interpretation of tax laws. Uncertainty in tax law arises when there are 
questions that a taxpayer cannot definitively resolve based on the available tax law authority. 
This negatively impacts investor confidence. As the New Zealand tax scholar, John Prebble, 
states: ‘Doubts as to the tax effects of one's proposals can mean that to put them in train is 
to embark on a hazardous journey across a fiscal minefield, guided by maps that are 





Tax laws are often drafted in complex language, resulting in uncertainty about the tax 
treatment of some transactions. Incredibly complex tax rules may have small loopholes that 
leave their application uncertain (Field 2018). Further, some provisions are drafted in broad 
and general terms, making their application uncertain. For example, anti-avoidance 
provisions are often drafted in general terms, so that a literal interpretation of their words 
would catch entirely innocent transactions (Banoff 1995). There may also be uncertainty in 
tax law, where certain decisions are left at the discretion of the tax authority. Uncertainty in 
tax law may also be due to the frequency with which tax laws are amended. For example, in 
Uganda the VAT Act that came into force in 1996 and the Income Tax Act Cap 340 that 
came into force in 1997 have both been amended a total of 20 times, with at least 1 
amendment taking place every year since 2008. The excessive rate of amendment of tax 
laws creates undue complexity, unpredictability, and uncertainty in the private sector. The 
frequent amendments may create apparent conflict between new amendments and existing 
provisions of the law, making it difficult for even tax advisors to be certain of the URA’s 
interpretation of the law without clear guidance from the authority. As one Ugandan tax 
practitioner has put it, ‘the rapid pace of tax law changes creates more tax risk and 
controversy since taxpayers find themselves always aiming at a moving target in their tax 
compliance agenda’ (Baliraine 2019). 
 
While courts do fill part of the void of uncertainty through clear pronouncements in tax cases 
before them, they have a circumscribed role and require considerable resources and time on 
the part of the taxpayer, and therefore cannot suitably replace administrator guidance. The 
important role of tax administrator guidance was highlighted in the English case of R v 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte MFK Underwriting Agencies (Ex parte MFK 
Underwriting Agencies),8 where the court acknowledged: ‘the long-established practice by 
which the Revenue gives advice and guidance to taxpayers. This is sometimes done by 
public statements of the Revenue’s approach to a particular fiscal problem.  Sometimes 
advice is given in answer to a request from an individual taxpayer. The practice exists 
because the Revenue has concluded that it is of assistance to the administration of a 
complex tax system and ultimately to the benefit of the overall tax yield’. 
 
Clear communication from the tax authority regarding interpretation of tax statutes is 
therefore necessary, so that taxpayers can know which side of the line their transactions may 
fall even before they engage in them. As Francis Kamulegeya, one of the leading tax 
practitioners in Uganda states: ‘Private rulings are an effective way for a taxpayer to 
establish, at an early stage, the URA’s position on a proposed transaction or business 
arrangement, before the taxpayer decides to proceed with the transaction or not. This 
enables the taxpayer to assess in advance what the potential tax liability may be if they were 
to proceed with the proposed transaction or arrangement. This would enable them to take 
into consideration the tax implications of the transaction as they contract with the other party’ 
(Kamulegeya 2010). 
 
Similarly, in the Australian case of Commissioner of Taxation v Brian John McMahon9 the 
court stated: ‘The private ruling provisions were introduced to assist taxpayers who are 
uncertain about the tax effect of an arrangement that is proposed, commenced or completed 
and who wish to obtain a ruling from the Commissioner on this question before the 
assessment process is complete. It enables a taxpayer to order their affairs with a degree of 
certainty about their tax implications before they embark or whilst they are embarking, upon 
courses of conduct, the tax implications of which may not be known for a considerable time’. 
 
 
8  R v Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte MFK Underwriting Agencies & Others [1990] 1 All ER 91 at 113. 




It is crucial to note that the ‘certainty’ referred to here is certainty as to how the CG interprets 
and applies tax law for particular transactions, and not certainty as to the operation of the law 
itself (Scolaro 2006). Private rulings provide only the URA’s interpretation of the law 
(Parliament 2014). This recognises that there may be other interpretations of the law that 
remain valid and arguable, despite being inconsistent with the ruling.  
 
1.2 Promote simplicity in tax law 
 
The private rulings regime promotes simplicity in the tax system, which ideally would 
enhance compliance. The absence of simplicity tends to invite tax avoidance. Changes in tax 
law will lead taxpayers to respond by rearranging their affairs in order to reduce their liability 
under the new laws. They do this even though the underlying economic nature of the 
activities remains unchanged. This tax avoidance activity then tends to invite a complex set 
of rules to close loopholes. Tax avoidance is thus a game of cat-and-mouse played between 
the tax authority and taxpayers. Every change to the tax system is soon followed by the 
invention of new avoidance schemes, which in turn lead to further changes in the tax system. 
The perpetual revision of tax law and constant litigation in an effort to curb avoidance adds to 
the complexity of tax laws. For the taxpayer, compliance costs are increased by the constant 
search for new avoidance schemes, and as a result of litigation. The private rulings regime is 
meant to promote simplicity, which minimises avoidance activities and reduces the total 
economic cost of taxation (Mirrlees 2012). 
 
However, the relevance of private rulings in curbing tax avoidance should not be overstated. 
Despite the option to apply for a private ruling, a taxpayer might prefer to engage in tax 
avoidance without requesting a private ruling. Moreover, private rulings may be used to 
support tax avoidance. Taxpayers could use the system to legitimise tax avoidance activities, 
by seeking confirmation from the tax authority that a tax avoidance scheme works – thereby 
turning the private rulings system into ‘the approval centre for tax-planning ideas’ (Williamson 
and Bryant 1998: 279). Nonetheless, the potential for private rulings to promote simplicity in 
tax law should be acknowledged. 
 
1.3 Improve the relationship between the URA and the taxpayer 
 
The private rulings regime is part of the horizontalisation of tax administration, or adoption of 
a co-operative compliance regime. This is a result of a general shift in approach among tax 
administrations away from the traditional top-down vertical approach (Van de Velde 2015; 
Deák 2004).10 In a co-operative compliance regime, the taxpayer is treated as a customer 
who deserves good service. Where the taxpayer voluntarily reveals information about 
potential tax risk positions, the taxpayer is entitled to a comprehensive response from the tax 
authorities (Van de Velde 2015). The high degree of disclosure by the taxpayer deserves a 
quick, fair and efficient response and treatment. The tax authority in turn endeavours to 
understand the taxpayer’s business and tax strategy, and act fairly without the traditional 
revenue-oriented mindset (Van de Velde 2015). Where a taxpayer can access a ruling, 
drafted on the basis of consistent application of tax principles and binding on the tax 
authority, there may be less need for tax avoidance efforts, and therefore a less antagonistic 
relationship between the tax authority and the taxpayer. As Seiden and Russell state:  
‘The existence of a rulings system reduces the attraction of games of ‘cat and mouse’ by 
offering the mouse a morsel of the tastiness of the cheese on offer while affording the cat 
advance notice of the size of the mouse population and its unfolding stratagems’ (Seiden and 
Russell 2018: 439). 
 
10  An example of the horizontal approach is the system of ‘horizontal monitoring’ used as an alternative to ‘vertical tax 





The private rulings regime thus strengthens the taxpayer/tax authority relationship through 
enhanced cooperation, resulting in a more efficient tax system. In this regard, the private 
rulings regime works to complement general cooperative compliance programmes 
(Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). 
 
1.4 Support the self-assessment regime 
 
The private rulings regime is a necessary ancillary of a system of self-assessment (Chan 
1997). One result of a self-assessment regime is that taxpayers will be uncertain, sometimes 
for long periods, whether what they have filed, and the assumptions that they have made, 
are accepted by the URA. If the taxpayer finally turns out to be wrong, back taxes, interest 
and penalties will be levied in respect of financial years that are long past.  
 
The private rulings system is therefore helpful to the taxpayer, who may wish to know if their 
tax return will meet with the tax authority’s agreement. The self-assessing taxpayer can 
determine early through post-transaction rulings whether the tax authority will be satisfied 
with the tax return. This is useful to the taxpayer in forward planning in the light of known 
future cash flows. The private rulings process can also alert tax practitioners or tax 
authorities to tax issues that may not have previously been considered. Such rulings 
therefore ensure that the taxpayer knows their liabilities and legal position, so as to avoid any 
penalties associated with an incorrect self-assessment. 
 
1.5 Reducing litigation 
 
A reduction in controversy and conflict is one of the benefits of a private rulings regime. This 
is because private rulings can be used as a means of resolving technical tax issues before a 
formal dispute arises (Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). Taxpayers have the opportunity of 
discovering in advance the opinion of the tax authority, and are therefore less likely to fight 
the results in court (Prebble 1993). 
 
Tax litigation in Uganda is particularly challenging for taxpayers. Before proceeding to the 
Tax Appeals Tribunal (TAT), a taxpayer is required to deposit 30 per cent of the tax 
assessed or part of the tax assessed not in dispute, whichever is greater.11 Further, tax 
litigation is fraught with challenges, such as delays. A 2019 study of the tax litigation process 
in Uganda found that 84 per cent of tax cases in TAT take longer than 12 months to be 
resolved (Sserunjogi and Lakuma 2019). Moreover, on appeal to the High Court, interest 
continues to run on the tax assessed at a rate of 2 per cent on the unpaid amount, from the 
date the tax ought to have been paid to the date it is actually paid (Sserunjogi and Lakuma 
2019).12 The challenge of undue delay remains even at the High Court, where a backlog of 
cases is also encountered (The Judiciary 2016). 
 
Private rulings are an alternative to litigation that can be cheaper and faster for a taxpayer 
with constrained resources or a time-sensitive transaction. 
 
1.6 Keep URA up to date 
 
A private rulings regime can also be useful in the enforcement of tax laws. Tax authorities 
often face some challenges in keeping up with the latest practices in commercial and tax 
planning. Formal requests for rulings on proposed arrangements constitute one way for tax 
 
11  Section 15 of the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act Cap 345. 
12  This position was successfully challenged in Airtel Uganda Ltd v URA CACA No 40 of 2013; however, URA has 




authorities to keep up to date (Prebble 1993). They are a mechanism to improve information 
flows to the tax authority on current developments in the business sector involving tax 
avoidance schemes (Sawyer 2002b).  
 
Private rulings can also be useful to URA in profiling a taxpayer, to determine the level of risk 
they pose. Due to the high level of disclosure they require, private rulings can function as a 
window into the different arrangements and commercial practices of a particular taxpayer. 
With very little effort on the part of URA, it acquires information with which to build up 
intimate tax profiles of taxpayers. 
 
 
2  The current private rulings legislative 
scheme  
 
The private rulings regime in Uganda was first introduced in the Income Tax Act (ITA), which 
came into force in 1997. Section 161 of the ITA provided that a taxpayer could apply in 
writing for a private ruling setting out the CG’s position regarding the application of the ITA to 
a transaction proposed or entered into by the taxpayer. In 2005 a similar provision was 
created in the Value Added Tax Act.13 Significantly, other domestic tax statutes, such as 
those governing excise duty14 and stamp duty15 did not contain any provisions for private 
rulings. In 2014 the Tax Procedures Code Act (TPCA) repealed the private rulings provisions 
in the ITA and the VAT Act, and replaced them with another more elaborate provision on 
private rulings applicable to all domestic tax laws.16  
 
The DTD in URA is responsible for planning, management and coordination of registration, 
audit, assessment, collection and accounting of domestic taxes. The Commissioner 
Domestic Taxes (CDT) has six Assistant Commissioners, including the Assistant 
Commissioner Business Policy (AC-BP) – who is in charge of private rulings (URA 2020). In 
administering the regime the DTD is assisted by the Legal Services and Board Affairs 
Department, which is headed by a Commissioner responsible for policymaking, advising 
URA on legal matters and overseeing URA’s operations (URA 2020). 
 
2.1 Application for a private ruling 
 
2.1.1 Application must be in writing 
 
A taxpayer seeking a private ruling must apply in writing to the CG.17 This application is in 
the form of a formal letter addressed to the CG or the CDT requesting a private ruling. The 
letter may be written and signed by the taxpayer,18 tax representative19 or tax agent.20 As 
with most jurisdictions (Prebble 1993), URA does not entertain anonymous applications for 
private rulings. Considering that one of the justifications of the private rulings regime is 
 
13  Section 3 of the Value Added Tax (Amendment) Act, 2005. 
14  The East African Excise Management Act, 1970 and the Excise Tariff Act, Cap 338. 
15  Stamps Act Cap 342. 
16  Section 45 of the TPCA. 
17  Section 45(1) of the TPCA. 
18  Section 45(1) of the TPCA. 
19  Section 14(1) of the TPCA. A tax representative is a guardian or manager for an individual under a legal disability, the 
chief executive officer, managing director, or any director of the company for a company, a partner in a partnership, a 
trustee of the trust, the accounting officer in the case of a ministry, government department or agency or a foreign 
government, and in the case of a non-resident person, the individual controlling the person's affairs in Uganda. 




intelligence-gathering by the tax authority, allowing a taxpayer to obtain a ruling without 
revealing their identity is an unreasonable advantage. 
 
2.1.2 Rulings may be pre- or post-transaction  
 
The TPCA refers to ‘a transaction entered into or proposed to be entered into’.21 The 
taxpayer can therefore seek a private ruling either before or after a transaction. This is in 
marked contrast to certain jurisdictions, where the taxpayer can only seek a ruling after 
engaging in the transaction (Van de Velde 2015).22 Pre-transaction private rulings give 
taxpayers certainty about how the URA will apply the tax laws in respect of transactions that 
have not yet occurred. In some jurisdictions, notably Canada, post-transaction private rulings 
in respect of completed transactions cannot be obtained (Prebble 1993). Such an approach 
seems to undermine many of the benefits of private rulings in a self-assessment regime, 
where the taxpayer may remain uncertain for years whether their returns were accepted. In 
Birungyi, Barata & Associates v URA,23 the URA declined to give a private ruling on the 
grounds that the transaction was already concluded. In its ruling, the TAT found that the URA 
erred in refusing to give the private ruling.  
 
2.1.3 Requirement of full disclosure  
 
The application should be ‘a full and true disclosure of the nature of all aspects of the 
transaction relevant to the ruling’.24 This means that the taxpayer should reveal all the 
necessary information for the CG to properly understand the transaction at issue. As 
Bingham LJ stated in the English case of Ex parte MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd,25 to 
amount to full disclosure, ‘it is necessary that the taxpayer should have put all his cards face 
upwards on the table’. All relevant details of the transaction should be communicated to the 
CG. The courts in Australia have repeatedly emphasised the importance of providing detailed 
information in an application for a private ruling. For instance, in Bellinz v FCT,26 court noted 
that ‘it is imperative that an applicant give full details to the Commissioner either in the initial 
application or in response to requests by the Commissioner for additional facts’. In National 
Speakers Association of Australia Inc v FCT,27 Emmett J noted that: ‘It is, of course, clearly 
in the interests of a prospective taxpayer or applicant to set out with sufficient particularity the 
arrangement in respect of which a ruling is sought ... an arrangement which will bear as 
much resemblance as possible to an arrangement which might actually come into operation’. 
 
In Commissioner of Taxation v Brian John McMahon,28 Emmett J stated: ‘It would be of utility 
to a Taxpayer to obtain a ruling only if the Taxpayer were diligent to ensure that the 
arrangement which was the subject of the application reflected either actual facts and 
circumstances or facts and circumstances which would be likely to occur in the future’. 
 
The CG may reject the application if the information provided therein is insufficient to make a 
private ruling.29 The CG may, however, sometimes write requesting more information rather 
than rejecting the application. As a matter of practice, an applicant may be contacted formally 
(in writing) or informally (via phone call) and asked for some additional information after the 
 
21  Section 45(1) of the TPCA. 
22  e.g. rulings in the United Kingdom are generally not binding on the tax authority, and only become binding under the 
administrative law principle of legitimate expectation. 
23  Birungyi, Barata & Associates v URA [2017] UGCOMMC 94. 
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initial application is filed. Further, where the ruling relates to a scheme that has not yet begun 
to be carried out, the applicants may not be able to provide all the relevant information 
required to make a ruling. In such instances issuing a private ruling may involve making 
assumptions about a future event on which the position in the ruling hinges. Any such 
assumptions made by the CG must be communicated to the taxpayer in the private ruling.30 
However, in light of the fact that there is a statutory requirement for the applicant to provide 
full disclosure, the CG ought not to make an assumption as to information that the applicant 
might be given the opportunity to provide. As a matter of good practice, the applicant ought 
to be notified about any proposed assumptions and given a reasonable opportunity to 
respond prior to issuing the private ruling (Seiden and Russell 2018).   
 
2.1.4 Transaction must not be hypothetical 
 
The application must not relate to a hypothetical transaction that the applicant is unlikely to 
engage in. Where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the transaction will not be 
carried out, the CG may reject the application.31 This is in line with the practice of most 
jurisdictions (Prebble 1993). General tax queries relating to the applicant’s general affairs or 
to speculative transactions are usually rejected on these grounds. Other compliance 
programmes, such as taxpayer education and general communications, are used to address 
such concerns. In the Australian case of Commissioner of Taxation v Brian John McMahon32 
the court noted that: ‘Private rulings may be … sought upon hypothetical facts. The 
Commissioner is, however, empowered to decline to deal with an application for a private 
ruling … thus ensuring that he is not dealing with purely academic exercises that may have 
no practical significance and deterring any person who seeks to abuse the system and waste 
public resources … The private ruling system rests on the premise that the taxpayer will not 
abuse the system and will genuinely seek to obtain rulings in relation to anticipated facts or 
facts which are in fact known’. 
 
Determining that a transaction may not be entered into or is hypothetical is not always 
straightforward. All applications relating to transactions not yet entered into are in a certain 
sense hypothetical. The likelihood of a particular applicant engaging in a particular proposed 
transaction is therefore the test to apply. This appears to be a purely subjective test. Where 
the application is by an experienced tax agent, it would ordinarily be easy for the tax agent to 
draft the application to ensure that the proposal at least looks possible. Applications are more 
likely to be rejected as purely hypothetical when a taxpayer with no technical tax experience 
drafts the application on their own. Tax practitioners reported that this provision has 
sometimes been abused by the URA, to reject a valid application when it is inconvenient for 
them to respond.  
 
2.1.5 Why some taxpayers may not apply  
 
Where the law is ambiguous, a taxpayer may still have strategic reasons for opting not to 
apply for a private ruling. First, applying for a private ruling may increase the probability of 
further scrutiny from URA where it attracts its attention to questionable transactions. Even 
taxpayers in industries subject to relatively high audit rates may expect some legally 
ambiguous tax issues to go undetected. A taxpayer applying for a private ruling raises ‘red 
flags’ regarding ambiguous legal issues, increasing the chance that URA will consider them. 
Private rulings are issued by the URA’s national office, while tax audits may be conducted by 
district offices. Taxpayers may generally assume that officers at the national office have 
more expertise than officers at the district offices, and are less likely to err in their 
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interpretation of the law. Taxpayers may sometimes prefer more errors of interpretation, 
because they may benefit from the mistakes that result in a lower tax obligation, while 
mistakes that result in a higher tax obligation can be corrected (Givati 2009). 
 
2.2 Review of an application for a private ruling 
 
2.2.1 Rulings and Interpretations unit 
 
In Uganda, as in most common law jurisdictions (Prebble 1993), the private rulings 
procedure is administered by the tax authority, as opposed to an independent or semi-
independent organisation. Private rulings are managed by the URA, and specifically handled 
by the BPD within the DTD of the URA. The BPD is headed by an Assistant Commissioner, 
AC-BP. The Rulings and Interpretations unit in the BPD is in charge of private rulings. The 
unit is headed by a manager in charge of a team of four supervisors, each of whom oversees 
the work of two officers. Personnel deployed in the Rulings and Interpretation unit usually 
have at least five years’ experience in operational work in other divisions of the DTD, with 
some experience in interpretation of the tax laws prior to being deployed in the unit.  
 
Although it is not a requirement to be a lawyer to work in the unit, the unit always has at least 
5 lawyers out of its 13 personnel. These usually have operational experience as opposed to 
a purely legal experience – they have previously been deployed in an operational capacity in 
a different DTD division. The operational experience is considered essential because it gives 
one a practical approach to interpretation of the statutes, as opposed to the purely theoretical 
view of an armchair analyst. The lawyers are particularly helpful when the assignment 
involves extensive reference to case law or interpretation of non-tax statutes, such as the 
Companies Act,33 Partnerships Act34 and Business Names Registration Act,35 which may 
sometimes be relevant. No particular academic qualification is considered essential for a 
non-lawyer deployed in the Rulings and Interpretations unit. Nonetheless, the non-lawyers 
usually have professional qualifications, such as being certified public accountants or 
certified tax advisors or holding an Advanced Diploma in International Taxation.  
 
The personnel in the Rulings and Interpretations unit is often given training on interpretation 
of tax statutes, tax avoidance schemes and emerging areas of interest in taxation and 
business. This training is provided by internal facilitators, such as fellow URA staff with 
particular skill and experience in these areas, or by external facilitators, such as tax scholars 
and tax practitioners. The training is scheduled at the beginning of each financial year, but ad 
hoc training can be organised if an urgent need is discovered.  
 
2.2.2 Drafting the private ruling 
 
An application for a private ruling is transmitted from the office of the CDT or the CG to the 
AC-BP, who assigns it to the Manager Rulings and Interpretations, who in turn assigns it to a 
supervisor, who also assigns a Case Officer (CO) to handle it. The assignment of the task is 
usually based on the particular skill set a CO or supervisor may have. For example, 
international tax-related matters will be assigned to the team with the most skill or training in 
that field. This specialisation is not intentional, but arises inevitably because the CO with the 
greatest capacity in a particular field will likely handle an assignment fastest. At least three 
technical personnel of the Rulings and Interpretations unit will review the draft of a private 
ruling before it is transmitted to the CDT for final consideration and signature. The first is the 
CO who has primary responsibility for the ruling, and will ordinarily have the highest level of 
 
33  Companies Act, 2012. 
34  Partnerships Act, 2010. 




involvement in the process. The depth of analysis by the CO with respect to a ruling 
application will range from very extensive to cursory, depending upon the nature of the 
subject matter and tax laws upon which the ruling is sought. In preparing the draft private 
ruling, the CO consults reference material such as tax statutes, practice notes, explanatory 
memoranda, Hansards, and previous private rulings where applicable. Copies of all previous 
private rulings are accessible to the Rulings and Interpretations unit. Between 2014 and 2016 
these private rulings were made available to URA staff in an electronic format accessible 
through the URA intranet. However, the practice of uploading them ceased in 2016. This 
practice was revived in September 2020, and there are plans to upload all previously issued 
private rulings.  
 
In formulating their draft, the CO may also consult their supervisor and may invite the 
applicant for discussions to get a better understanding of the proposed or completed 
transaction or applicant’s understanding of the applicable law. The CO may make a site visit 
to the applicant’s premises where necessary, or request a nearby URA branch to send a field 
officer to inspect the taxpayer’s premises if they are too far away from the URA 
headquarters. The CO may also consult personnel in operational departments who may have 
more experience with a particular issue raised in the application. Where technical matters 
such as those of a scientific nature are raised, the CO may consult with the Science Team in 
the Tax Investigations Department. External consultants or experts are never consulted, 
even when the expertise is lacking within the URA, due to resource constraints. Instead the 
taxpayer may be required to provide independent expert verification of their assertions at 
their own cost, or the private ruling may be rejected due to the amount of resources required 
to issue it. 
 
The CO’s draft is transmitted to the supervisor, who usually also has technical input. The 
supervisor is usually more experienced than the CO, and is expected to draw on this 
experience in critiquing and adding value to the draft. The supervisor then transmits the draft 
to the Manager Rulings and Interpretation, who provides general direction and guidance to 
the supervisor and CO. The manager then transmits the draft to the AC-BP, who usually has 
only general oversight or involvement with a particular issue. Prior to 2019, the AC-BP would 
critique the draft private ruling, then send it to the CDT for signature. However, since 
September 2019 AC-BP is required to send the draft private ruling to the Assistant 
Commissioner Board Affairs, Policy and Rulings (AC-BAPR) for concurrence before 
forwarding it to the CDT. This step was added as an additional level of quality assurance, to 
ensure that the private ruling is in line with tax law. Where the AC-BAPR concurs, the draft 
private ruling is then forwarded to the CDT for signature. Where AC-BAPR does not concur, 
engagements are held between the Rulings and Interpretations team and the BAPR team to 
arrive at a harmonised position before the private ruling is forwarded to the CDT for 
signature.  
 
Comprehensive data relating to private rulings could not be accessed. However, interviews 
with Rulings and Interpretations staff revealed that private ruling applications usually relate to 
mergers and acquisitions, demergers, spin-offs, cross-border transactions, income splitting, 
transfer of shares, branch taxation, re-characterisation of transactions, and implications of 
change of residence on the taxpayer’s assets. Novel issues that have arisen in recent 
months include tax relief, public/private partnerships, hazardous waste disposal, unitisation 
projects, and oil- and gas-related transactions. It is estimated that about 12 private rulings 






2.2.3 Timeframe for delivery of private rulings 
 
There is sometimes a delay in issuing private rulings. There is no statutory time limit within 
which to respond to applications. However, both URA personnel and tax practitioners 
acknowledged that there is occasionally a delay. The URA personnel estimated that on 
average they take six weeks to respond to private rulings, but tax practitioners estimated four 
months. The challenge of delays in issuing private rulings is commonplace among tax 
authorities. Lack of timeliness in delivery of private rulings by the ATO is a common 
complaint in Australia (Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). Delay in issuing a private ruling may 
be because of the complexity of applications, the CO’s inexperience, applicant delays in 
providing necessary information, protracted discussions and engagement with applicants, or 
shortage of qualified COs.  
 
2.2.4 Other roles of the Rulings and Interpretations unit 
 
Although private rulings account for about 80 per cent of the Rulings and Interpretations 
team’s work, they also engage in other related activities. Besides private rulings, the unit also 
provides technical support to the operational divisions of the DTD. This is usually done by the 
manager issuing guidelines or internal memoranda on their own initiative, or upon request 
from a particular division or unit of the DTD. The unit also prepares practice notes, which are 
issued by the CG. In fulfilment of URA’s mandate of advising the Minister of Finance on 
revenue implications, tax administration and aspects of policy changes relating to all 
taxation,36 the Rulings and Interpretations unit serves as the DTD’s technical liaison team 
with the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. The Rulings and 
Interpretations unit also participates in the tax amendment process, by collecting and vetting 
tax amendment proposals from URA personnel and assisting First Parliamentary Counsel in 
the drafting of the provisions of tax bills (MoJ 2020). 
 
Information collected through private ruling applications has resulted in a number of tax 
amendments. In 2019 and 2020 amendments were introduced to the provisions of the 
domestic tax laws relating to tax incentives after the Rulings and Interpretations team noted 
frequent rejections of applications due to the restrictive wording of the law. In 2018 the rules 
for income sourced from Uganda were amended to include income derived from the direct or 
indirect change of ownership by 50 per cent or more of an entity located in Uganda. This 
followed the issuance of a private ruling in which the Rulings and Interpretations team noted 
a loophole in the law that was being exploited by that taxpayer. 
 
2.3 Decision on the private ruling 
 
There are three possible results of an application for a private ruling: 
 
1. The CG may reject the application. 
2. The CG may issue a favourable private ruling. 
3. The CG may issue an unfavourable private ruling. 
 
Where the CG issues a private ruling, whether favourable or not, the private ruling is issued 
in writing, contains the matter ruled, and identifies the taxpayer, the tax law relevant to the 
ruling, the tax period to which the ruling applies, the transaction to which the ruling relates, 
and any assumptions on which the ruling is based.37 In practice the CDT generally issues all 
private rulings on behalf of the CG. 
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2.3.1 Commissioner rejects an application for a private ruling 
 
An application for a private ruling may be rejected by the CG. This takes the form of a letter 
in response declining to issue the private ruling and stating the reason why.38 Section 45(2) 
of the TPCA lists the circumstances under which the CG may reject an application for a 
private ruling. Some of these, such as where insufficient information is provided and where 
the application is hypothetical, have already been considered. Below are other instances in 
which the CG may reject an application for a private ruling. 
 
Tax assessment already in place. Where the CG has already decided the matter that is the 
subject of the application in a tax assessment, the CG may reject the application.39 The 
rationale for this is that the taxpayer has recourse to the objections and appeals process as 
an alternative remedy.40 
 
Practice note already in place. Where the CG is of the opinion that an existing practice 
note adequately covers the matter that is the subject of the application, the CG may reject 
the application.41 A practice note is a document setting out the CG’s understanding of the 
application of a provision in a tax law.42 Once issued, a practice note, like a private ruling, is 
binding on the CG until they revoke it, but it is not binding on the taxpayer.43 Practice notes 
sometimes arise as a result of frequent private ruling applications relating to a particular 
provision or set of provisions. When a number of applications regarding the interpretation of 
a particular provision arise, the CG instructs the AC-BP to create a practice note interpreting 
that provision. The CG then issues the practice note by publishing it in the Gazette and on 
the URA website.44 Where a private ruling is inconsistent with an existing practice note, the 
private ruling has priority over the practice note to the extent of the inconsistency.45 
Therefore where the CG is satisfied that the practice note adequately addresses the issues 
raised by the application, it will be rejected. 
 
Tax audit or objection in place. Where the application relates to a matter that is the subject 
of a tax audit or an objection, the CG may reject the application.46 This is probably because 
audits and objections involve greater investigation into the facts of a particular transaction, 
and are therefore better suited to resolve any questions that arise therein. 
 
Frivolous or vexatious. The CG may reject an application that is ‘frivolous or vexatious’.47 
In R v Ajit Singh,48 court defined frivolous as ‘Paltry, trumpery; not worthy of serious 
attention; having no reasonable ground or purpose’. In Musuku v Bugiri Municipal Council,49 
the court defined a frivolous application as ‘one which has no serious purpose or value and 
carries little weight or importance’. A frivolous application is therefore one without any legal 
basis or merit. An application may be frivolous even when the applicant genuinely believes 
that their application raises serious questions of law and interpretation. On the other hand, a 
vexatious application has been defined as ‘one that is filed when a party is not acting bona 
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fide and is not calculated to lead to any practical result’.50 An application is vexatious when 
the applicant deliberately seeks to embarrass or distract the CG to no reasonable end. 
 
Resource-intensive. The CG may reject an application where they are of the opinion that it 
would be unreasonable to comply with the application having regard to the resources needed 
to comply.51 This may arise, for example, where extensive investigation into a multinational 
transaction is necessary before a private ruling can be issued. Such an investigation may 
require dedication of a lot of personnel over an extended period of time. In such an instance 
the CG may reject the application in order not to tie up staff on one application, while ignoring 
many others that may be equally urgent and important but less complicated. Alternatively, a 
proper understanding of the transaction may require the hiring of external experts or 
consultants, for which URA may lack resources.  
 
Pending before court. Although not provided for by statute, private rulings will generally not 
be issued in situations where the question of law involved is currently before the courts or 
TAT, whether in respect of the same or another taxpayer. This avoids the possibility of an 
absurd outcome where a private ruling is issued that contradicts a court decision. However, 
for this rule to be properly applied there ought to be greater linkages between the URA 
litigation team and the Rulings and Interpretations team. Very often the Rulings and 
Interpretations team does not know which cases are pending before the courts. Further, 
although this rule seems to be a reasonable limitation, it undermines one of the touted 
advantages of the private rulings regime – that it is more rapid than typical judicial 
proceedings. Further, it is patently unfair when the transactions of the many are held up while 
a particular case is waiting to be heard in court or before the TAT.  
 
2.3.2 Commissioner issues a favourable private ruling 
 
Where a taxpayer has made a full and true disclosure of the nature of all aspects of the 
transaction relevant to the private ruling, and the transaction has proceeded in all material 
respects as described in the taxpayer’s application, the ruling is binding on the CG in relation 
to the taxpayer to whom the ruling has been issued.52 This means that where the applicant 
receives a favourable private ruling, they will ordinarily be protected from additional tax, 
penalties and interest when relying on the ruling issued. In Biira Udear Co Ltd v 
Commissioner General URA,53 the plaintiff had been assessed and paid VAT for the supply 
of coffee husks and crushed palm kernel. The plaintiff subsequently applied for a private 
ruling contending that palm kernel and coffee husks were exempt from VAT. The CG issued 
a private ruling stating that the supply of coffee husks and palm kernel was exempt from 
VAT. On the strength of this private ruling, the plaintiff requested that the URA vacate its 
earlier assessments and refund the taxes erroneously paid, but the CG refused. The court 
held that in the absence of revocation of the private ruling or change of legislation, the 
plaintiff would enjoy the exemption. The private ruling meant that the plaintiff’s earlier 
payments were done in error, and the URA could not demand any payments. 
 
The binding effect of private rulings on tax authorities is generally accepted in many 
jurisdictions. In a 2015 OECD study of 51 countries with a private rulings regime, 46 reported 
that such rulings are generally binding on them (OECD 2015).54 In Kenya,55 Tanzania56 and 
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Zimbabwe,57 private rulings are binding on the tax authority. In its technical note on private 
rulings, the IMF recommends that ‘A private tax ruling should take the form of legally binding 
advice which a taxpayer may seek from the tax authority’ (Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016).  
 
However, the TPCA provides that ‘the ruling is binding on the Commissioner in relation to the 
taxpayer to whom the ruling has been issued’.58 This means that the private ruling is 
personal to the taxpayer; other taxpayers, even if in the same or similar circumstances, 
cannot derive legal rights from it. Equity and the need for uniform application of tax law would 
suggest that it would be unreasonable for one taxpayer to be treated more generously than 
another in similar circumstances simply because the first happened to have obtained a 
favourable private ruling. However, the Rulings and Interpretation personnel are only human.  
Private rulings may be issued in the context of a time-sensitive transaction and therefore 
processed in an expedited manner – increasing the potential risk of error. An error in 
interpretation by an officer in settling a ruling could result in huge losses of revenue if 
taxpayers other than the applicant could rely on the ruling. Other taxpayers wishing to benefit 
from that ruling can make applications themselves. Where enough consistent rulings have 
been issued a practice note could be issued, making further individual applications 
unnecessary. In Kenya, the 2015 Tax Procedures Act originally provided that private rulings 
were to be published, and any person could rely on a published ruling.59 However, in April 
2020 this provision was deleted, meaning that private rulings can now only be relied upon by 
the applicant.60 
 
The personal nature of private rulings means that they generally have no precedential effect. 
However, URA will endeavour to apply tax law uniformly. As already noted the CO may 
consult previous private rulings when reviewing an application. Further, private rulings may 
gain some precedential effect by the public getting to know about them. This is obvious in 
jurisdictions where private rulings are published in redacted form. In Uganda, the details of 
private rulings are protected by confidentiality, which applies to all information relating to 
taxpayers.61 However, even where they are not published they may have some precedential 
effect as they are likely to become generally known to taxpayers through the tax advisory 
community. 
 
2.3.3 Commissioner issues an unfavourable private ruling 
 
The CG may issue a private ruling that is unfavourable to the applicant. A private ruling is not 
a tax decision for the purposes of the TPCA, therefore the applicant cannot object to it under 
the normal objections procedure.62 This restriction is meant to prevent a flood of objections 
based on rejected private rulings. However, despite being binding on the CG, a private ruling 
is not binding on the taxpayer to whom it is issued.63 The rationale for this approach requires 
one to consider that there are two persons: the applicant, who argues that a transaction be 
taxed a certain way (or not taxed at all); and the URA, who represent a conflicting interest 
that may not necessarily lead to a conflicting point of view. Where the URA agrees with the 
applicant, it is simply saying that it shares the same view of the law as the applicant. As the 
main rationale for private rulings is the assurance of certainty, clearly the URA must be 
bound by its rulings. URA is thus bound to the applicant’s view, because the applicant will act 
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upon it. On the other hand, if the URA disagrees with the applicant, they are simply saying 
that their opinion is different from that of the applicant. It follows that the applicant should be 
allowed to carry out the transaction in a manner of their choosing, and to object to any 
assessment that may follow. Therefore, the taxpayer could simply ignore the unfavourable 
private ruling and proceed with their transaction as if it was never issued.  
 
However, as Francis Kamulegeya has cautioned in relation to unfavourable private rulings 
issued by URA, ‘if you decide to ignore what they say, then prepare for a tough battle ahead, 
because they will not back down easily’ (Kamulegeya 2010). Where a taxpayer ignores an 
unfavourable private ruling, the URA is likely to raise an assessment in relation to the 
taxpayer’s transaction to which the taxpayer can object through the normal objections 
procedure. In Warid Telecom Uganda Ltd v URA,64 the appellant sought a private ruling on 
the interpretation of VAT regulations. The taxpayer received an unfavourable ruling and soon 
received an assessment to which they objected, and eventually appealed against the 
objection decision. Similarly in Livingstone International v URA65 the applicant received an 
unfavourable ruling relating to taxation of employees. Following the assessment from URA, 
the applicant objected to the assessment and subsequently appealed to the TAT. Rulings 
and Interpretations officers noted that it is fairly uncommon for an unfavourable ruling to 
result in litigation. 
 
2.4 Rectification of a mistake in a private ruling 
 
Where the CG is satisfied that an issued private ruling ‘contains an error which is apparent 
from the record and that the error does not involve a dispute as to the interpretation of the 
law or facts of the case,’ the CG may, for the purpose of rectifying the error, amend the ruling 
at any time before the expiry of three years from the date of making that ruling.66 The error 
may be one of law or of fact, but it must not be a disputable one. If it is an error of law, the 
law must be definite and capable of ascertainment.67 The type of error that can be altered by 
the CG must be manifest and clear – that is, ‘apparent from the record’.  
 
Rectification cannot be used to cure an erroneous decision or position taken in a private 
ruling. In the case of Nyamogo and Nyamogo Advocates v Kogo,68 the Court of Appeal of 
Kenya stated: 
 
An error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or 
exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature … 
There is a real distinction between a mere erroneous decision and an error apparent 
on the face of the record. Where an error on a substantial point of law stares one in the 
face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, a clear case of error apparent on 
the face of the record would be made out. An error which has to be established by a 
long drawn process of reasoning or on points where there may conceivably be two 
opinions, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.69 
 
The error must be one that is clear to any reasonable person reading the private ruling 
without recourse to any other document or information. In Kanyabwera v Tumwebaze,70 the 
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Supreme Court of Uganda defined an error apparent on the record as ‘an evident error which 
does not require any extraneous matter to show its incorrectness’. 
 
Rectification cannot be used to alter the interpretation of the law given in a private ruling. In 
Biira Udear Co Ltd v Commissioner General URA,71 the CG had issued a private ruling 
stating that the supply of coffee husks and palm kernel by the plaintiff was exempt from VAT 
but denied them a refund on VAT paid on the same. Court held that there was no error 
apparent on the record, but rather a dispute as to the interpretation of the law – therefore the 
CG was functus officio and could not rectify the private ruling. Rectification is therefore a tool 
best suited to correcting clerical and other similar errors that do not involve a dispute as to 
the facts or law in issue.  
 
2.5 Revocation of a private ruling by the Commissioner 
 
The TPCA provides that the CG may revoke a private ruling in whole or in part by written 
notice served on the taxpayer to whom the ruling is issued.72 Circumstances under which the 
private ruling may be revoked, though not explicitly stated in the TPCA, can be inferred from 
the provisions and an understanding of the rationale for private rulings. The purpose of a 
private ruling, as we have seen, is to give the taxpayer a level of certainty about how the tax 
authority will treat their transactions. The TPCA also provides that private rulings are binding 
on the CG where the applicant has made a full and true disclosure of the nature of all 
aspects of the transaction relevant to the ruling, and the transaction has proceeded in all 
material respects as described in their application.73 Private rulings can therefore be revoked 
by the CG in only two instances: 
 
1. Where the CG erred in interpreting the law. 
2. Where the applicant did not make full and true disclosure of the transaction and the 
transaction has not proceeded as described in their application. 
 
Once revoked, the private ruling cannot be relied upon by the taxpayer. Consequently, the 
CG may issue an assessment contrary to the revoked private ruling. 
 
2.5.1 Commissioner misinterprets the law 
 
Situations arise where the CG may interpret the law in an incorrect manner. For example, the 
private ruling may be issued in ignorance of a court decision that gives a contrary view, or a 
court may subsequently hold the position in a private ruling to be an incorrect application of 
the relevant tax law, or the private ruling may be issued in a manner that is inconsistent with 
international legal obligations under existing tax treaties (Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). In 
such scenarios, the private ruling should ideally be revoked. However, a challenge arises 
regarding what interpretation to adopt for the period during which the ruling was in force 
where the private ruling relates to a series of transactions. Would the transactions that took 
place while the private ruling was in force or after it has been revoked remain governed by 
the CG’s initial interpretation? It has been argued that in order to ensure certainty and 
fairness in tax administration, the private ruling must be considered as binding on the CG 
even where the law had been misinterpreted (Scolaro 2006). A question also arises 
regarding a one-off transaction entered into by a taxpayer, following the issuance of a private 
ruling that is subsequently found to have been based on a misinterpretation of the law. In 
such a case, should the private ruling be revoked? 
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A public body that makes an undertaking in conflict with its statutory duty can, in principle, go 
back on the essentially illegal undertaking.74 However, where in reneging on its previous 
assurances the public body exercises its statutory power in a manner that causes unfairness, 
that exercise is an abuse of power and the otherwise illegal undertaking may be upheld by 
the courts. In R v Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte MFK Underwriting Agencies & 
Others,75 the Revenue had issued a general press release in 1982 applying capital gains tax 
to redemption of index-linked bonds and restated the same to the applicants on inquiry. In 
1988, however, the Revenue decided to levy ordinary income tax on the bonds. The 
applicants contended that it was unfair and an abuse of power. The court held that the 
general statements made by the Revenue could not be relied on as creating a legitimate 
expectation that it would not tax the bonds in question on the correct principles. However, 
court noted that: ‘If however, the taxpayer approaches the Revenue with clear and precise 
proposals about the future conduct of his fiscal affairs and receives an unequivocal 
statement about how they will be treated for tax purposes if implemented, the Revenue 
should in my judgment be subject to judicial review on grounds of unfair abuse of power if it 
peremptorily decides that it will not be bound by such statements when the taxpayer has 
relied on them’.76 
 
Significantly, however, a Kenyan court has held that the requirement of legality of the 
position in a private ruling takes precedence over the need for certainty – therefore, where 
the private ruling misinterprets the law, it should be revoked. In Republic v Commissioner of 
Domestic Taxes Exparte Sony Holdings Limited (Sony Holdings),77 following the destruction 
of the applicant’s mall in a terrorist attack, the applicant sought and received a private ruling 
from the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) confirming that they could claim Commercial 
Building Allowance on reconstruction costs if they provided roads, water, sewers and other 
social infrastructure. Relying on this private ruling, the applicant incurred significant costs in 
constructing, upgrading and improving various roads. Subsequently, KRA denied the 
applicant the building allowance, arguing that the private ruling was granted subject to the 
transactions’ compliance with the relevant legal provisions, and it did not in any way negate 
the mandatory provisions of law. The court acknowledged the need for the promotion of legal 
certainty in private rulings, but considered that certainty must be balanced against legality, 
stating:  
 
The fear in protecting legitimate expectations substantively is that administrators may 
be forced to act ultra vires. That would be the case where an administrator has created 
an expectation of some conduct, which is beyond his authority or has become beyond 
his authority due to a change of law or policy. If the administrator were consequently 
held to that representation, he would be forced to act contra legem. It is clear that such 
representations will not be upheld by the court … The value of legality in law has led to 
the requirement that the expectation must be one of lawful administrative action before 
it can be either reasonable or legitimate. Legality therefore seems to take precedence 
over legal certainty in law.78 
 
However, in Gordon Sentiba & others v Uganda Revenue Authority (Gordon Sentiba),79 the 
Ugandan court emphasised the value of certainty over legality. In that case the CG had 
revoked a favourable private ruling previously issued to applicants after a full disclosure of 
 
74  Preston v IRC [1985] 2 All ER 327. 
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of Kenya at Nairobi Misc. Civil Application No. 363 of 2018. 
78  Republic v Commissioner of Domestic Taxes Exparte Sony Holdings Limited Judicial Review Division in The High Court 
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the transaction had been made. The court considered that: ‘Where full disclosure is made … 
the private ruling is binding. What is material is whether there was full disclosure. There is no 
evidence that the Commissioner for Domestic Taxes did not have all the materials. 
Moreover, the law does not make it clear that the opinion may not be wrong. What happens if 
the opinion is wrong? In my view, it cannot just be revoked. The tax payer … should be 
heard’.80 
 
In Sony Holdings the applicant’s argument that it had a legitimate expectation that KRA ‘will 
not issue an incomplete, defective and deceptive private ruling deliberately concealing other 
applicable and mandatory conditions, with the intention of inducing the applicant to act on the 
said ruling to its detriment’ was ignored by the court, which considered this to be an attack on 
the merit of the ruling that was outside the purview of judicial review. The legitimate 
expectation argument was accepted in the Ugandan case of NSSF v URA,81 wherein NSSF 
wrote to URA and received a letter in response in 2001 clarifying that interest paid to 
members’ accounts by NSSF is an allowable deduction. However, in 2013 URA wrote 
another letter, communicating that the said interest is not in fact an allowable deduction and 
sought to recover the previously uncollected tax from NSSF. NSSF argued that the 2001 
letter was a private ruling, and created a legitimate expectation of tax treatment of its 
transactions. Court rejected the argument that the letter was a private ruling as it did not 
meet the statutory requirements of one, but accepted that legitimate expectation had been 
created stating:  
 
A particular interpretation assigned by the Authority to a particular provision of the law 
is a lawful construction of such a provision unless and until otherwise changed by them 
or by a higher authority. The Authority has the power and mandate to enforce and 
adhere to such an interpretation of the law in a bid to give effect to a relevant provision 
of the law. Such an interpretation does not have to be infallible. It may be a wrong 
construction of the law but as long as it is made through the right channels and in a 
proper exercise of jurisdiction, it is lawful and binding upon not only the people who 
receive and rely on it but also on the Authority itself. It is therefore not a correct position 
of the law that if the Authority later on discovers that it was wrong in a previous 
interpretation of the law, and as a result changes its position, that the earlier position is 
deemed illegal and unreliable. I find that an absurd interpretation of the law. The 
Authority has the right and power to change its position on a particular interpretation. 
But when it does so, their new position takes effect from the time it is made and does 
not render the earlier position illegal or unreliable.82 
 
In this case the court found URA to be bound by its previous communication purely on the 
basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, because the communication did not amount to 
a private ruling. However, in Gordon Sentiba, where the communication in issue was a 
private ruling, the court noted that the argument of the applicants for legitimate expectation 
was not premised merely on the doctrine of estoppels but rather on the statutory provision as 
well, which provides that the private ruling is binding. The position in Uganda therefore 
appears to be that a private ruling is binding even when it amounts to a misinterpretation of 
the law. Any revocation cannot have retrospective effect due to the legitimate expectation of 
the applicant arising out of the doctrine of estoppels and the statutory provision which states 
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2.5.2 Applicant did not make full disclosure/transaction materially different 
 
A private ruling can be revoked where a taxpayer has not ‘made a full and true disclosure of 
the nature of all aspects of the transaction relevant to the ruling’, and the transaction has not 
‘proceeded in all material respects as described in the taxpayer’s application for the ruling’.83 
 
The requirement of full disclosure is not fulfilled merely because sufficient information is 
given to the tax authority. The disclosure must relate to the totality of the transaction and its 
full tax implications. In Matrix-Securities Ltd v IRC,84 the applicant was the sponsor of a 
scheme to develop an enterprise zone property that intended to make use of capital 
allowances available on the purchase of buildings in that zone. The applicant sought 
clearance from the tax authority in a letter outlining the scheme in general misleading terms, 
because the tax authority would not clear the scheme for the capital allowances if the details 
were known. The authority gave assurance regarding capital allowances without 
qualification. Three months later the tax authority wrote to the applicant effectively revoking 
the assurance. The applicant sought judicial review of the revocation decision. The court held 
that it was a sophisticated tax avoidance scheme, and the applicant’s letter was inaccurate 
and misleading. The assurance was therefore given wrongly, and it was not an abuse of 
power to withdraw it. The fact that sufficient information had been disclosed to enable 
inferences to be drawn did not amount to full disclosure. 
 
Arguably, insistence on the transaction not having ‘proceeded in all material respects’ as 
described limits CG’s grounds for revocation considerably. To require anything less would 
severely undermine the goal of certainty that underpins the private rulings regime. Without 
the qualification of ‘material respects’, the capacity to withdraw a ruling would be virtually 
unbounded. What constitutes material respects is not defined in the statute. In Carey v 
Field,85 Merkel J considered that something would be ‘material’ if it would have resulted in a 
different tax outcome: ‘In my view if it is reasonably open to the Commissioner to form the 
view on the material before him that, because of a difference between the arrangement 
implemented and that ruled upon, the tax outcome for a taxpayer who is a member of the 
class of persons to whom the ruling was intended to apply is capable of being, or is or likely 
to be, different to that provided for in the ruling, that difference is a material difference’. 
 
In Mount Pritchard & District Community Club Ltd v FCT (Mount Pritchard),86 the applicant 
had obtained a private ruling in 2004 stating that the club was exempt from income tax.  
However, in 2006 the Commissioner determined that the applicant’s amalgamation with 
another club was a material change to the arrangement that had been ruled on in 2004, and 
assessed the applicant. The Court held that where there has been a material change in the 
activities of an applicant to those that existed at the time that a ruling was issued, then the 
ruling does not bind the Commissioner for those years of income where the activities are 
materially different. The court reasoned that: ‘[A] private ruling can only bind the 
Commissioner in respect of the arrangement ruled upon, or where the taxpayer relies upon 
the ruling by acting in accordance with it. If, in a subsequent period after the private ruling the 
taxpayer enters into different arrangements, or does not act in accordance with the ruling 
because of changed circumstances, then the Ruling does not bind the Commissioner. The 
taxpayer still obtains the protection afforded by the private ruling regime, but only to the 
extent the taxpayer implements the scheme or arrangements the subject of the ruling’.87 
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Therefore, the position in Uganda is that where a taxpayer has not provided accurate or 
sufficient information in applying for the private ruling, the ruling can be revoked and the 
revocation applied retrospectively. 
 
2.5.3 Procedure of revocation by the Commissioner 
 
The TPCA is silent on any procedure to be adopted in revoking a private ruling. However, the 
CG ought not to revoke a private ruling without first giving the adversely affected taxpayer a 
fair opportunity to make representations challenging the revocation, because a taxpayer 
would reasonably expect such a procedural step (Azzi 2016). In the Australian case of Carey 
v Field,88 a ruling had been issued to a partnership stated to have no more than 20 partners 
and requiring that olive trees be planted before 30 June 2001. The Commissioner withdrew 
the ruling because the arrangement was implemented in a manner materially different from 
the application, because there were in fact seven partnerships and the trees had not been 
planted by 30 June 2001. Court held that the Commissioner was bound by the rules of 
natural justice, which required that the partnership be provided an opportunity to be heard 
prior to withdrawing the ruling. 
 
The requirement of fairness in administrative decisions is rooted in article 42 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, which provides for the right to just and fair treatment 
in administrative decisions. A presumption of procedural fairness therefore inheres in favour 
of a taxpayer, even in the absence of clear statutory language establishing it. The taxpayer 
has a legitimate expectation limiting the URA from validly exercising power without according 
procedural fairness to those whose interests will be affected. In Sony Holdings, one of the 
court’s considerations in upholding the revocation was the fact that there was evidence that 
KRA officers visited the applicant and requested documents before the decision to revoke 
the private ruling and raise the assessment was made. Court concluded that this was 
adequate notice and fair hearing.  
 
The requirement of procedural fairness applies independent of the merits of the revocation. 
Where the proper revocation procedure has not been followed, Ugandan courts have 
consistently quashed the revocation without enquiry into the merits. In Gordon Sentiba & 
others v URA,89 the applicants who had settled a suit for the sum of US$2.7 million and 
interest as the value of their shares in a company, applied for a private ruling seeking 
confirmation that the payment was not a taxable gain. The private ruling was issued stating 
that the income and interest were exempt. Three months later, the private ruling was revoked 
without any reason and without notice to the applicants. URA wrote to the Privatisation Unit 
that was to pay the applicants, instructing them to withhold tax. The applicants brought an 
action for judicial review against the URA. Court held that the applicants’ constitutional right 
to be treated justly and fairly had been infringed. The court stated that:  
 
 It is a cardinal rule of procedural fairness and justice that no party shall be condemned 
unheard … It is not mere courtesy that a party to a ruling on a pertinent question 
affecting their tax liability which ruling involves colossal sums of money is at the very 
least entitled to be heard on the question as to why their liability which had avoided 
over 2 billion Uganda shillings in the Respondents ruling should be revisited on them. 
Such a liability should not be imposed without a hearing of the affected persons. 
Especially since they had been given a favourable ruling showing that the item in 
question is not taxable.90 
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Where procedural fairness has been breached, it is possible for a party who was not an 
applicant of the private ruling, but whose interests are affected by the revocation, to seek 
judicial review. In Salim Alibhai and Others v URA (Salim Alibhai),91 the applicants sold their 
shares in a non-resident company called Shalvik which was the majority shareholder of a 
resident company called Sadolin, which was subsequently renamed Kansai Plascon Uganda 
Ltd (KPUL). KPUL applied for and was issued with a private ruling providing that the 
applicants were not subject to capital gains tax on the sale of their shares. The private ruling 
was revoked without a hearing and the applicants sought judicial review. URA claimed that 
they were not parties to the private ruling, and only KPUL could seek judicial review. Court 
rejected this argument citing the Judicature (Judicial Review) (Amendment) Rules of 2019, 
which provide that any person who has a direct or sufficient interest in a matter may apply for 
judicial review. The court stated:  
 
 The interests of the applicants are not in dispute and they are all directly affected by 
the decision to revoke the private ruling out of which a tax obligation has arisen. The 
applicants are all directly affected since they were beneficiaries of the respondent 
Private Ruling … The argument by the respondent that the private ruling was by a 
different entity is very lame and crippled … The application for a private ruling was for 
the benefit of all the applicants in order to be informed about their tax obligations 
before the conclusion of the sale of shares and this fact is not disputed by the 
respondent.92 
 
The court found that the revocation of the private ruling without giving the applicants a 
hearing was tainted with illegality. Therefore for any revocation of a private ruling to be 
legitimate, the recipient of the private ruling must be given a fair hearing before the 
revocation can take place.  
 
2.6 Revocation of a private ruling by operation of law 
 
A taxpayer who is in receipt of a private ruling may find limited utility in it if the relevant tax 
law applied by the CG in the ruling has changed. This is a considerable risk in a jurisdiction 
where the tax law is frequently amended. Where the law on which the private ruling is based 
is amended, the taxpayer ought not to be able to rely on the ruling. This is because allowing 
the taxpayer to benefit from the private ruling would place them in a more favourable position 
than other taxpayers in the same circumstances, thereby defeating the principle of equity and 
fairness in tax administration. In the Australian case of IOOF Holdings Ltd v FCT,93 
Robertson J stated: ‘a private ruling is only binding up to a change in the law and, apart from 
a statutory provision providing otherwise, a ruling and therefore an application for a ruling or 
any accrued rights thereunder does not survive a change in the law’.94 
 
Further, in the Australian case of Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v FCT,95 the legislature had 
amended a provision on which a private ruling had been based after it had been issued. The 
court held that the private ruling was not binding on the tax authority.  
 
A change of law in Uganda would therefore amount to a revocation of a previously issued 
private ruling based on the old law. However, where such a change in law comes into force 
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in the course of that taxpayer’s year of income, it would only impact that taxpayer with the 
private ruling in the next year of income.96  
 
 
3  Evaluating the private rulings regime 
 
3.1 Strengths of the Ugandan private rulings regime 
 
3.1.1 Use of a statutory regime 
 
The Ugandan private rulings regime is founded in statute rather than as a mere 
administrative creation of the URA. According to the Lex Mundi study of private rulings 
regimes in 61 jurisdictions, seven jurisdictions have private rulings as a matter of 
administrative practice by tax authorities with no statutory basis (Lex Mundi 2012).97 Among 
the OECD countries, only Ireland, Turkey and New Zealand have administrative private 
rulings regimes without a statutory basis (OECD 2015: 289). A non-statutory private rulings 
regime is less reliable for investors, as it is unlikely to confer an enforceable right to seek 
guidance from the tax authority. Further, the rulings given without a statutory basis are likely 
to give rise to disputes regarding their binding nature. 
 
A formal system of private rulings was founded in statute in order that the URA’s authority to 
make such rulings be manifestly clear, and in order that the taxpayer’s right to access the 
regime be an enforceable right rather than a discretionary action by the CG. A clear statutory 
framework supports taxpayers who have to subject themselves to a high standard of 
disclosure in order to obtain a ruling (Parliament 2014). 
 
3.1.2 Use of a centralised system 
 
The use of a central office, the BPD, minimises the risk of private rulings with differing 
positions for taxpayers in similar circumstances. A central specialist unit concentrates in one 
place a body of (documented) knowledge, and staff with experience who can ensure that 
private rulings are issued speedily and accurately. Jurisdictions such as Australia and 
Germany, where the private rulings can be issued by different tax districts, are often blighted 
by conflicting rulings from different district offices on a similar set of facts (Prebble 1993). A 
decentralised system risks taxpayers ‘shopping’ for a favourable ruling from different district 
offices, and attempting to play one local office against another. Centrally-issued private 
rulings are more consistent in application and quality. Taxpayers also have more confidence 
in advice from a central office because it is able to demonstrate expert knowledge, leading to 
fewer objections and disputes (Chan 1997). 
 
3.1.3 Absence of an appeals process 
 
Most jurisdictions with a private rulings system do not provide for a formal appeal process in 
case of unfavourable private rulings outside of the normal objection process for tax 
assessments (Sawyer 2002a). Where the private ruling is binding on the tax authority but not 
on the taxpayer, as is the case in Uganda, it is appropriate not to make the private ruling 
reviewable or subject to appeal, because the taxpayer can proceed with the transaction 
despite the adverse ruling and will be able to appeal any subsequent assessment 
(Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). In Australia there is the right of objection for taxpayers 
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dissatisfied with a ruling because the taxpayer faces a penalty of 25 per cent on the tax 
shortfall for departure from the ruling (Sawyer 2006). In the United States and Canada, 
where rulings do not bind taxpayers, there is no right of appeal (Sawyer 2002a). 
 
Further, courts are likely to be opposed to an appeal process that involves litigation in the 
case of pre-transaction private rulings, because this will require courts to rule on hypothetical 
situations (Sawyer 2002a). In Legal Brains Trust Ltd v Attorney General of the Republic of 
Uganda,98 the court stated: ‘A court will not hear a case in the abstract, or one which is 
purely academic or speculative in nature - about which there exists no underlying facts in 
contention. The reason for this doctrine is to avoid the hollow and futile scenario of a court 
engaging its efforts in applying a specific law to a set of mere speculative facts. There must 
be pre-existing facts arising from a real live situation’. 
 
The current position, where the applicant can simply ignore an unfavourable private ruling, is 
therefore appropriate. 
 
3.1.4 Limited status of private rulings as law 
 
Private rulings are intended to provide the CG’s interpretation of tax law, and are not law. 
The legal regime governing the private ruling system in Uganda does not contemplate that 
they will be treated as law, but rather as a supplement to the law. Under the Ugandan 
constitutional framework the CG cannot create tax legislation, as this power rests solely with 
parliament.99 On the other hand, the need for certainty in the application of taxation laws 
requires that private rulings be given legislative backing to the extent that the CG will be 
estopped from subsequently denying the position communicated in the ruling. 
 
Nonetheless, private rulings are often so heavily relied upon in practice by taxpayers and tax 
advisors that they may be said to have acquired the status of ‘de facto law’. This is especially 
the case where there is great uncertainty due to complexity and frequent amendment of tax 
laws. Private rulings are often meaningful and sophisticated interpretations of law, and may 
sometimes be the only source of clarification on a significant legal point. Where the law is 
entirely uncertain or unsettled, a private ruling may amount to private or administrative law 
making (Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). Private rulings may also be said to have the force of 
law, because the taxpayer can rely upon a favourable ruling as if it were the law. However, 
courts in Uganda have previously disregarded practice notes and would treat private rulings 
similarly, as constituting no more than the CG’s opinion of a tax law.100 
 
Their apparent de facto law status notwithstanding, the current treatment of private rulings as 
mere pronouncements of the CG of their interpretation of the tax law should be maintained. 
Private rulings are a supplement to, and not a substitute for, clearly drafted legislation. Even 
if all legislation were clear and concise the private rulings system may still be desirable, even 
if only to increase taxpayer certainty (Sawyer 2002a). The challenge of frequent amendment 
of tax laws cannot be papered over by way of private rulings. The private rulings regime 
should not replace critical tax reform in developing countries (Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). 
 
3.1.5 Reliance on human resource from diverse backgrounds 
 
The Rulings and Interpretations unit is made up of lawyers, accountants and other personnel 
specialising in different tax fields. It is helpful to have a diverse group, because private 
rulings applications often involve analysis of complex transactions, raising legal and 
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accounting issues, and possibly other specialised issues. In re Bercu,101 a United States 
court noted that ‘taxation is a hybrid of law and accounting’, acknowledging the role 
accountants may play in interpretation of the law. In designing transactions such as mergers, 
demergers or spin-offs, taxpayers may consult a variety of tax experts and advisors of 
various professional backgrounds. It therefore makes sense that the URA team that analyses 
these various transactions similarly has a diverse background. 
 
The requirement of at least five years’ experience in working in taxation before joining the 
Rulings and Interpretations team is helpful. The previous experience means the personnel 
will have adequate knowledge of taxation of different types of transactions, and therefore 
may be able to better advise the taxpayer. It also means that there will be less time wasted 
on understanding simple transactions before a ruling can be issued. 
 
3.2 Limitations of the Ugandan private rulings regime 
 
3.2.1 Insufficient revocation procedure  
 
There is need for a more elaborate revocation provision. The current provision does not 
clearly state the grounds on which a revocation can be made, and the procedure to be 
followed in revocation. The result is that revocations have been issued on suspicious 
grounds and without procedural fairness, as is evidenced in the cases of Gordon Sentiba and 
Salim Alibhai. Procedural fairness requiring the CG to issue a notice of intention to revoke, 
and to hold a hearing with the taxpayer prior to revocation, should be placed in the statute to 
put an end to revocations without due process. Revocations without procedural fairness 
undermine the rationale for private rulings.  
 
Ordinarily, justice requires that revocation of private rulings should not be retroactive 
(Prebble 1993). However, where the revocation is by operation of law or due to inadequate 
information provided by the taxpayer, it may be applied retroactively. Where, however, the 
revocation is due to a misinterpretation of the law by the URA when issuing the private ruling, 
it ought not to apply retroactively where the taxpayer has already altered their affairs in 
reliance on it. While the URA ought not be required to be bound by a position that contradicts 
its mandate to collect taxes, it is necessary to balance the legal certainty rationale of private 
rulings and the tax authority’s need to uphold its mandate. In the UK, incorrect advice by 
HMRC will not be binding; however, where the taxpayer can show financial detriment would 
occur if the correct advice were applied the taxpayer will be protected (Daly 2020: 117). A 
reasonable position to adopt in Uganda would therefore be that where transactions are 
continuing, revocation cannot be done retroactively. A taxpayer with a five-year running 
contract may obtain a private ruling relating to payment of sub-contractors prior to 
commencement of the contract. The CG may determine that the private ruling was based on 
a misinterpretation of the law in the second year of the contract. The taxpayer should be able 
to continue to rely on the private ruling for the remaining three years even after the CG 
makes that determination (Prebble 1993). As regards one-off transactions, where the 
arrangement has already been entered into prior to the discovery of the misinterpretation, 
then a revocation cannot issue. However, if the taxpayer has not yet begun to carry out the 
specified scheme, the private ruling may be revoked (Seiden and Russell 2018). This would 
mirror the position on practice notes, which function somewhat similarly to private rulings – 
except that they provide the CG’s interpretation of a tax statute to the general public. They 
are similarly binding only on the CG. A practice note continues to apply to a transaction 
 




commenced before the practice note is revoked, but does not apply to a transaction 
commenced after the practice note is revoked.102 
The major drawback of this approach is that, while it promotes certainty and a certain degree 
of fairness, it infringes the principle of equity – where taxpayers in the same position are 
treated in the same way. One taxpayer taking advantage of an erroneous private ruling for a 
number of years may be unfair to other taxpayers unable to access the same treatment. 
Nonetheless this approach appears to be the most reasonable one. In Matrix-Securities Ltd v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners,103 in relation to an erroneous private ruling issued by the 
tax authority, Lord Griffith considered that ‘It is part of the human condition that people will 
make mistakes, but they must not be held to mistaken decisions if the mistake is discovered 
in time to take effective remedial action’. He, however, went on to note that if the applicant 
had spent money in promoting the proposed scheme prior to the revocation, ‘fairness 
demands that the applicant should be reimbursed for this out-of-pocket expense and it could 
be regarded as an abuse of power for the Revenue to refuse to do so’. This challenge can 
further be mitigated to some extent by providing for time limits within the private rulings 
themselves. For example, a transaction may be exempted from tax only if it is carried out 
within, say, 24 months. After expiry of that period a new ruling would be necessary. This 
approach has the merit of attempting to balance the certainty of tax law against the reality of 
constant change in legislation or interpretation of the law. Alternatively, the tax implications of 
a certain investment vehicle or course of action may be ruled upon and effective for, say, four 
years. Taxpayers engage in multifarious transactions and business operations, such that 
there is no merit in having a fixed specific duration applicable to all private rulings. Where 
taxpayers have not yet taken advantage of a private ruling, revocation should be possible 
(Prebble 1993).  
 
3.2.2 Private rulings ought to be published 
 
Given their putative de facto law status, private rulings ought to be published to enhance 
fairness between taxpayers, and to give all citizens access to sources of tax law and its 
application. Publication must be subject to the deletion of details that would identify the 
taxpayer or their commercial secrets (Prebble 1993). While not universally done, publication 
of redacted private rulings is considered best practice. Publication promotes transparency, 
and supports the general objectives of certainty and consistency of the tax system as a 
whole. 
 
Substantial risks exist where confidential private rulings are not published or otherwise 
reported. If it is accepted that private rulings constitute de facto law yet they remain 
confidential and personal, they may thereby also constitute a body of secret law (Thompson 
1976). The discretion given to URA to issue private rulings could lead to private law-making 
outside the normal legislative process. Confidential private rulings can result in a parallel 
method of tax policymaking, thereby creating a hidden source of tax law. This runs counter to 
normal operation of the rule of law (Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). Secret law between 
particular taxpayers and the tax authority is antithetical to transparency and fairness. This 
can only be adequately cured through publication. 
 
Such secret law would also likely result in secret favouritism, where certain taxpayers receive 
favourable rulings while similarly situated taxpayers receive unfavourable ones. Taxpayers 
may be able to rely on political clout or possibly even bribery to access a favourable private 
ruling. The tax system in Uganda is already perceived by many taxpayers as unjust and 
favourable to the wealthy and politically connected (Ali et al. 2014). The URA’s effectiveness 
as a tax authority is heavily dependent on public faith in consistent and uniform 
 
102  Section 44(6) of the TPCA; Aisha Tumusiime v URA TAT No 31/2007. 




administration of the tax laws. In the United States, fears of secret favouritism by the Internal 
Revenue Service in the issuance of private letter rulings prompted demands for disclosure of 
private letter rulings (Oran 1973; Thompson 1976). The IRS now generally makes private 
letter rulings public after all identifying information has been redacted (IRS 2020).  
 
Further, failure to publish redacted private rulings denies Ugandan citizens their 
constitutional right to access information. The right of citizens to access ‘information in the 
possession of the State or any other organ or agency of the State except where the release 
of the information is likely to prejudice the security or sovereignty of the State or interfere with 
the right to the privacy of any other person’ is enshrined in article 41 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Uganda and section 5 of the Access to Information Act, 2005. Redacted private 
rulings therefore ought to be publicly available. 
 
However, publication of private rulings is not without costs. There is a possible loss of privacy 
for the taxpayer. Publishing a sanitised version of the private ruling, where the identifying 
details of the taxpayer and their particular transaction have been removed, may not always 
be sufficient. In developing countries there may be very few players in certain sectors of the 
economy, such that the private ruling beneficiary is easily identified. This was the rationale 
for the repeal of the statutory requirement to publish private rulings in Kenya (KRA 2020).104 
A more pragmatic approach would be to publish an abstract or summarised version of the 
private ruling, omitting even tangential identifying information. It should also be considered 
that some taxpayers may be indifferent to anonymity, while others might welcome publicity. 
For example, financial institutions might welcome publication of a favourable private ruling on 
the tax consequences of a new kind of investment structure or instrument they wish to 
promote. Optional anonymity could be made part of the application process, so taxpayers 
ask for it if they desire it. 
 
Another concern in publication of private rulings is that an erroneous ruling involving a 
misinterpretation of the law by the URA would be available to more taxpayers, instead of just 
the individual taxpayer to whom it had been issued. As already noted, human error is 
possible and can result in a private ruling based on wrong interpretation of the law. However, 
the published private ruling would only remain binding on the CG in relation to the taxpayer 
to whom it was issued. Other taxpayers would only become aware of the ruling through its 
publication, but would have to similarly apply and receive such a ruling before they are able 
to bind the CG to that position. 
 
Further, where sanitised private rulings are to be published, it is likely that the consequence 
will be fewer and more limited rulings involving a longer review time. It can be presumed that 
where rulings are published, more applications for private rulings will be accompanied with 
briefs pointing out the existence of previous similar rulings, and each will require more 
processing time. Further, the fact that the private ruling will in effect be relied on by more 
than just the applicant (even though it may not be binding on the CG in regards to those 
taxpayers) will require more time and effort in the review. This may lead to delay, which 
defeats one of the major benefits of private rulings. Publication of sanitised private rulings 
may therefore require adding staff to the Rulings and Interpretations team to ensure that 
rulings are still handled expeditiously.  
 
Despite the valid privacy and confidentiality concerns, it should be noted that most 
jurisdictions with private rulings publish them in a sanitised form (Sawyer 2002b). Sanitised 
private rulings in South Africa are published on the website of the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS 2020). The URA can follow suit, and publish private rulings on its website. 
 





Content that could identify the taxpayer to whom the relevant ruling has been issued, such as 
names and description of unique transactions or dealings, should be removed. URA also 
ought to publish an annual report on private rulings issued. The report would cover the total 
number of private rulings granted or rejected, and an estimate of their revenue impact. 
Publication of this report would provide oversight bodies such as the Ministry of Finance, 
Planning and Economic Development, the Finance Committee of Parliament and the Auditor 
General’s office with necessary information.  
 
Overall it should be considered that the benefits of broader publication outweigh the costs 
associated with it. Full disclosure of redacted private rulings ensures that neither 
incompetence, which results in unintentionally erroneous rulings in the applicant’s favour that 
give a competitive advantage, nor deliberate favouritism, is being concealed, and would 
promote confidence in the rulings regime and the tax system in general. Even if a decision is 
made not to publish private rulings, they should be made open to inspection. Many rulings 
may be of little to no importance to the general public, because they are highly specific to the 
applicant. There would probably be very few applications to see private rulings, and they 
would still need to be redacted before being made available to members of the public.  
 
3.2.3 Private rulings should not remain free of charge 
 
A fee is charged for private rulings in some jurisdictions as a means of cost recovery. In the 
European Union 10 countries charge fees, while 15 do not (Van de Velde 2015). An OECD 
study found 21 out of the 56 countries considered charged a fee to access a tax ruling 
(OECD 2015). In the United States there was no cost for applying for private rulings until a 
fee was introduced in 1987. Between 1987 and 1990 it cost US$600; it rose to US$3,966 in 
1990 and US$10,000 in 2007 (Givati 2009). Current fees in the United States range from 
US$6,200 for applications relating to accounting periods, to US$30,000 for applications 
relating to proposed or completed transactions (IRS 2020). In Canada the fee for a ruling is: 
for each of the first 10 hours Can$100, and Can$155 for each subsequent hour spent on the 
ruling request (CRA 2020). In South Africa, SARS charges an application fee of R2,500 
(US$150) for small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) and R14,000 (US$860) for all 
other applicants for private rulings (SARS 2013). In addition, the applicant pays a cost 
recovery fee that is based on the number of hours that it takes to consider the issues raised 
in the application, and any direct costs incurred in issuing the ruling, such as visits to the 
applicant’s premises or obtaining the services of a consultant or expert to advise upon 
technical aspects of a proposed transaction. Cost recovery fees range from R10,000 to 
R35,000 for standard rulings taking an estimated 20 days to complete, R35,000 to R70,000 
for involved rulings taking an estimated 45 days to complete, and R70,000 to R105,000 for 
complex rulings taking an estimated 60 days to complete (SARS 2013). 
 
A number of reasons are given for charging a fee for private rulings. First, a fee may help the 
tax authority to overcome implementation challenges, such as limited resources, and limit the 
demand for rulings that would otherwise exceed the authorities’ capacity to deliver them 
within a reasonable time (Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). Second, the fee is also justified on 
the grounds that the private ruling provides the taxpayer with material value in the form of 
certainty about its transactions, which is likely to far outweigh any costs incurred in terms of 
the fee paid. Third, tax authorities, including the URA, usually assign the ruling to a team of 
highly qualified people. Retaining this level of talent, which is often in high demand among 
tax advisory firms with significantly higher rates of pay than the public sector, may require the 
tax authority to recover some costs from those who most directly benefit from it. Moreover, 
where the tax authority absorbs the cost of administering the private rulings regime, 
resources are likely to be diverted from other tax administration functions to cover this 




required very urgently, and needs to be prioritised above all others. In such a case it may be 
appropriate to charge a higher cost-recovery fee from the applicant, who would likely be 
willing to pay in order to be prioritised (Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016).  
 
However, introducing a fee for private rulings does have its challenges. First there is concern 
that fees might undermine the neutrality and independence of the private rulings regime –
where the taxpayer has paid a considerable sum for the ruling, it is less likely to be 
unfavourable (Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). This concern seems far-fetched, and ascribes 
undue weight to the payment of a statutory fee. Second is a concern that a high cost of 
access will undermine the equity principle of taxation, by denying taxpayers with limited 
resources access to the private rulings service. However, this inequity might be mitigated by 
the publication of private rulings, allowing them to provide value to other taxpayers in similar 
circumstances.  
 
We recommend the introduction of a fee for private rulings in a similar structure to SARS, 
where a more complex transaction that requires more time for consideration pays a higher 
sum. An option for a higher fee for an expedited private ruling would also be appropriate. 
This would be an equitable approach, especially if balanced with the publication of private 
rulings, allowing less affluent taxpayers access to the same ruling. 
 
3.2.4 Delays in issuing private rulings  
 
The process of issuing a private ruling may get delayed, especially when the matters dealt 
with are complex and/or significant. Lengthy delays may, however, undermine the key 
objective of providing certainty of tax treatment for a taxpayer’s particular transaction on a 
timely basis (Waerzeggers and Hillie 2016). These delays may lead to businesses losing 
opportunities – there is often a restricted window in which to sign off a project, and this may 
be missed if there is a delay in obtaining a private ruling. The danger in excessive delay in 
issuing private rulings was highlighted in IOOF Holdings Ltd v FCT,105 where the 
Commissioner delayed to issue a private ruling and a few months later there was a change in 
the law. IOOF contended that it had an accrued right to have its private ruling application 
determined according to the law prior to the amendment. Court held that IOOF had an 
accrued procedural right to have its application for a private ruling determined by the 
Commissioner. However, IOOF did not have a substantive right to have its application 
determined according to the law as it applied prior to the amendments. 
 
However, it should be noted that sometimes the delay might be justified. Where the matter is 
particularly complex, the tax authority may need time to consider it. In April 2020 the Kenya 
Tax Procedures Act was amended to extend the time limit in which a private ruling can be 
issued from 45 days to 60 days.106 The purpose was to ensure that adequate time is 
dedicated to dealing with complex issues in private rulings. In Matrix-Securities Ltd v IRC,107 
Lord Jauncey stated: ‘In my view, the Revenue when asked for clearances or other views 
should never feel pressurised by importunate taxpayers or their prestigious advisers. Rather 
should they take such time as is reasonably necessary for them to give full consideration to 
the problems placed before them. Taxpayers and their advisers should appreciate this when 
asking the Revenue for their view’. 
 
One solution to the challenge of delays is to institute a time limit for issuing a private ruling 
after an application has been lodged. The 2015 OECD study found that over two-thirds of tax 
authorities providing private rulings reported the existence of statutory or administrative time 
 
105  IOOF Holdings Ltd v FCT (2014) 224 FCR 535. 
106  Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2020. 




limits for issuing rulings, with some indicating additional time requirements for complex cases 
or where further information is required from taxpayers. The time limits varied widely, ranging 
from 28 days to one year (OECD 2015: 290). We propose a 120-day time limit within which 
the private ruling must be issued after the application has been lodged. Where there is delay 
beyond the 120-day limit, the applicant can seek judicial review to compel the CG to issue 
the private ruling. While it is acknowledged that some private ruling applications may be 
considerably complex and may therefore require time for document review and consultation, 
and while it is also acknowledged that the Rulings and Interpretations unit is understaffed, a 
120-day time limit appears reasonable and fair to both the taxpayer and tax authority. The 
tax authority has a 90-day time limit in which to consider an objection to an assessment.108 A 
120-day time limit for a private ruling is therefore reasonable and fair. As with objections to 
assessments, the time limit for issuing a private ruling may be extended after notifying the 
taxpayer where an extensive review of voluminous taxpayer records is necessary.109 In the 
event of judicial review due to delay, the URA may seek to justify the delay on the basis of 
resource constraints. In this instance the court would presumably reject the argument, just as 
it would reject a similar argument made for a delay in issuing an objection decision.110   
 
3.2.5 Human resource challenges  
 
The 13 personnel of the Rulings and Interpretations unit are not enough to attend to all 
private ruling applications from across the country and also offer internal advice to different 
divisions within the DTD. Depending on the nature of the transaction, some private ruling 
applications may involve bulky contract documents and financial information, all of which 
needs to be perused before the ruling can be drafted. The Rulings and Interpretations team 
also provide responses to internal queries from staff of other divisions, and liaise with the 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development during the tax amendment 
process. The Rulings and Interpretations staff are often plagued with backlog, and some 
private rulings have been known to be delayed for six months. Further, some applications 
can be incredibly complex or novel – requiring a specialised skill in order to make a proper 
determination of the tax consequences, which may be lacking in the unit. 
 
It is recommended that there should be at least 25 personnel in the Rulings and 
Interpretations Unit. This will help to deal with the challenge of backlog and speed up 
transactions. It is also recommended that external consultants be hired when necessary. If a 
fee is introduced for private rulings, this can be used to remunerate such consultants. This 
could result in higher quality private rulings based on the consultant’s expertise.  
 
3.2.6 High risk of bias against the taxpayer 
 
It has been questioned whether the CG, whose primary role is tax collection, can have the 
necessary independence required to operate a private rulings regime fairly for taxpayers 
(Scolaro 2006). As the URA’s primary role is to collect tax revenue,111 the case can justifiably 
be made that the CG has a pecuniary interest in the private rulings they issue. It is probable 
that the URA will err on the side of revenue when interpreting law for the purpose of issuing 
private rulings. This may be considered a form of inherent pro‐revenue bias within the private 
rulings regime, whether perceived or actual (Scolaro 2006).  
 
 
108  Section 24(6) of the TPCA. 
109 Section 34(9) of the TPCA. 
110  Courts in Uganda strictly uphold the 90-day requirement for objection decisions URA v Uganda Communications 
Commission [2007] UGCOMMC 4. 




There is unlikely to be large-scale actual bias in the current private rulings regime, 
particularly concerning smaller amounts of tax and non‐complex tax matters. However, there 
may be actual bias where the ruling is complex and involves ambiguous but important 
provisions of the law. Tax practitioners claimed that where the law is relatively clear, there is 
little risk of bias. However, where the law is unclear, there is heavy bias towards collection. 
This bias towards collection is explained by the fact that BPD is under the office of the CDT, 
who is primarily a revenue collector. A more empirical study would be necessary to verify 
these claims of bias. Significantly, a 2008 report by the Australian Inspector-General 
examining ATO bias in issuing private rulings finds that, while there are significant 
perceptions of bias in the tax community, a close examination of the instances cited reveals 
that the ATO had simply adopted the ‘interpretations that best promoted the “policy intent” of 
the law, as the Tax Office understands it’ (Inspector-General of Taxation 2008: 3). 
Nonetheless, the risk of bias is worth examining. 
 
One of the ways that Uganda’s current private rulings regime has mitigated bias is through 
the requirement of concurrence by AC-BAPR. AC-BAPR is answerable to the Commissioner 
Legal Services and Board Affairs (CLSBA), who is not primarily a collector. This serves as a 
countervailing force, with presumably less bias in favour of collection. Nonetheless, even the 
CLSBA may be more likely to favour collection where the law is uncertain. Moreover, it can 
be argued that the requirement of concurrence by AC-BAPR adds to delay in the process of 
issuing private rulings. 
 
The most practicable solution would be for the Rulings and Interpretation unit to be semi-
autonomous and answerable to the URA Board of Directors, rather than the CDT or CGs 
who have a pro-revenue collection bias. This would make the unit a semi-independent arbiter 
in a more equitable system (Scolaro 2006). 
 
 
4  Conclusion 
 
The chief rationale for a private rulings regime is legal certainty to increase taxpayer 
confidence in how their transactions will be treated. This has significant implications for 
investor confidence and increased foreign direct investment, which is crucial for a developing 
country. The current regime in Uganda goes a long way towards achieving this goal. The 
private rulings regime confers statutory rights on the taxpayer, provides procedural 
safeguards and is administered by a highly qualified team. However, as seen above, certain 
challenges remain. These include: the status of private rulings as de facto law, the challenge 
of delays in issuing rulings, the lack of transparency in issuing them, and disregard for 
procedural fairness in their revocation. Further research in these areas is necessary for a 
fuller and clearer picture of the private rulings regime in Uganda. Empirical research is 
necessary to examine the frequency of issuing private rulings, their consistency and most 
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